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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, the federal courts are in disagreement as to whether a debtor in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding has an absolute right to dismiss her case in the 
face of an opposing motion to convert it to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.1 
Section 1307(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code2 states that “[o]n request by 
                                                                                                                                         
 * Law Clerk, Honorable Kenneth J. Meyers, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Illinois. The views expressed in this Article are not necessarily shared by the judges of 
the Southern District of Illinois. I am grateful to Judge Kenneth Meyers, Chief Judge Laura 
Grandy, and Joan Binetsch, Esq. for their collective support, inspiration, and guidance. 
 1 This is in contrast to the accord surrounding the extent of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right 
to convert to a Chapter 7. Section 1307(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states, in relevant part: 
“The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 13] to a case under [C]hapter 7 of [title 11] at 
any time.” 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2012). Section 1307(a) is widely acknowledged to create an 
absolute right. See, e.g., In re DeFrantz, 454 B.R. 108, 114-15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); In re 
Lassiter, No. 08–31578, 2011 WL 2039363, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 24, 2011); In re 
Campbell, 36 F. App’x 388, 389 (10th Cir. 2002); In re Torres, No. 99–02609, 2000 WL 
1515170, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2000); In re Humphreys, 64 B.R. 215, 216 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1986); In re Langston, 40 B.R. 272, 274 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983); In re Doyle, 11 
B.R. 110, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1981); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(f)(3) (providing that 
“[a] . . . [C]hapter 13 case shall be converted without court order when the debtor files a notice 
of conversion under . . . § 1307(a).”). 
 2 § 1307(b). One of the primary purposes of the modern American bankruptcy system is 
“to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive” 
and allow him to make a “fresh start.” Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). This is in 
contrast to the country’s earliest conception of bankruptcy. The Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution viewed the establishment of federal bankruptcy laws as necessary for the 
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the debtor at any time . . . the court shall dismiss” a previously unconverted Chapter 
13 case.3 Accordingly, a majority of courts hold that § 1307(b) imbues the Chapter 
13 debtor with an absolute right to dismiss her case, leaving the court with no 
discretion on the matter.4 A large minority of jurisdictions, however, maintain that 
                                                                                                                                         
prevention of interstate commerce conflicts. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 43 (1995). “The idea of 
a bankruptcy law as a means of providing a fresh start for distressed debtors was foreign to the 
framers.” Id. The country’s first federal bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Ch. 19, 
2 Stat. 19, only applied to merchant debtors and did not provide for voluntary bankruptcies, in 
line with the English Statute of George II, 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1735), on which it was based. 
Tabb, supra, at 14. Of course, the debtor’s “fresh start” is not the American bankruptcy 
system’s only policy. Professor Kenneth Klee notes that the following are also “fundamental 
bankruptcy policies”: equality of distribution of similarly situated creditors; deterring a race of 
diligence by creditors; “discouraging secret liens”; maximization of the value of the 
bankruptcy estate; “favoring business, farmer, railroad or municipal organizations”; and 
“generally precluding the allowance of postpetition interest on prepetition unsecured claims.” 
KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 242-43 (2009).  
  The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to receive a discharge of her debts through either 
liquidation or reorganization proceedings. See id. at 366–67. The avenue selected is 
determined by the chapter of the Code under which the debtor files her bankruptcy petition, as 
well as by the status of the debtor. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code cover general 
matters relevant to all bankruptcy cases. Chapter 7 governs liquidation proceedings. See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2012). Municipalities file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. See id. §§ 901-
946. Chapter 11 cases generally concern large and small corporate reorganizations. See id. §§ 
1101-1174. Family farmers may pursue reorganization under Chapter 12. See id. §§ 1201-
1231. Chapter 13 allows individuals to restructure their debts and enter into repayment plans. 
See id. §§ 1301-1330. And Chapter 15 concerns cross-border insolvency proceedings. See id. 
§§ 1501-1532. Chapters 7 and 13 are the most commonly used chapters. See United States 
Courts, Statistics, 2014 Bankruptcy Filings, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics 
/BankruptcyStatistics/2014-bankruptcy-filings.aspx; Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: 
An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 116 (2011). 
  This Article primarily concerns Chapters 7 and 13. In a proceeding filed under Chapter 
7, all of the debtor’s nonexempt assets become the property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 
U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). The Chapter 7 trustee “collect[s] and reduce[s] to money the property 
of the estate” (i.e., liquidates the debtor’s assets) and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s 
creditors. Id. § 704. After liquidation and distribution, the debtor receives a discharge of all 
pre-petition debts (even if the proceeds of the liquidation sale failed to fully satisfy all 
creditors), excepting the debtor’s non-dischargeable obligations. Id. § 524(a)(2). 
  Chapter 13 does not concern liquidation of assets, but rather repayment. Unlike the 
Chapter 7 debtor, the Chapter 13 debtor has the ability to keep his property. Andrew Harrell, 
Comment, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts: A Dishonest Debtor’s Right to 
Convert to Chapter 13, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 861, 864 (2008). Instead of liquidation, the 
debtor enters into a repayment plan supervised by the bankruptcy court whereby he dedicates 
his post-petition income to his creditors in monthly installments. Ransom v. FIA Card 
Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 n.1 (2011); Harrell, supra, at 864. Payments are made to 
the Chapter 13 trustee who in turn makes disbursements to the debtor’s creditors. Alan M. 
White & Carolina Reid, Saving Homes? Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in the 
Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1713, 1717 (2013). Upon completion of all required 
payments, the debtor receives a discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e) (2012). 
 3 § 1307(b).  
 4 See Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 
1999); In re Burba, No. 93-6479, 1994 WL 709314, at *10 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994); In re 
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the debtor’s right to dismiss is conditioned on the presence of good faith, even 
though the text of the Bankruptcy Code contains no such requirement.5 Therefore, 
the nature and extent of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to voluntarily dismiss her case, 
as well as of the bankruptcy courts’ abilities to police abuse and bad faith conduct, 
are dependent upon the district in which the Chapter 13 petition is filed.6 
In 2007, the minority position was bolstered by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,7 in which the Court 
held that a Chapter 7 debtor’s right to convert his case to one under Chapter 13 is 
tempered by a bad faith exception.8 While Marrama did not concern the same 
interplay of statutory provisions at issue in Chapter 13 dismissal cases, many courts, 
including the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, have cited Marrama in 
support of the proposition that a Chapter 13 debtor does not have an absolute right to 
dismiss.9  
While admittedly persuasive, any support Marrama lent to the minority position, 
and indeed the minority position itself, was eliminated by the Court’s 2014 decision 
in Law v. Siegel.10 In the case, Stephen Law filed a petition for bankruptcy under 
                                                                                                                                         
Dulaney, 285 B.R. 10, 15 (D. Col. 2002); Clearstory & Co. v. Blevins, 225 B.R. 591, 592 (D. 
Md. 1998); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 150 B.R. 36, 40 (N.D. Ill. 1992); In re Frost, 123 B.R. 254, 
259 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (citing In re Jourdan, 108 B.R. 1020 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989)); In re 
Rippe, No. 12–10220, 2013 WL 5701605, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2013); In re 
Mangual, No. 10–00124, 2010 WL 5185392, at *2 (Bankr. D.P.R. Dec. 20, 2010); In re 
Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 560 (N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Hamlin, No. 09–05272–8, 2010 WL 
749809, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2010); In re Campbell, No. 07–457, 2007 WL 
4553596, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2007); In re Perez, No. 07–12021, 2007 WL 
4893515, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 27, 2007); In re Davis, 352 B.R. 758, 764 (D.S.C. 
2006); In re Aupperle, 352 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005); In re Terry, No. 01–12750C–
7G, 2003 WL 21219818, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 23, 2003); In re LeGree, 285 B.R. 615, 
617 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002); In re Parrish, 275 B.R. 424, 425 n.1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2002); In 
re Whitmore, 225 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1998); In re Rosenthal, 117 B.R. 710, 711 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Redick, 81 B.R. 881, 885 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); Matter 
of Rementer, 58 B.R. 723, 724 (Bankr. D. Del. 1986). 
 5 See Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir. 2010); Rosson v. 
Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2008); Molitor v. Eidson (In re 
Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220-21 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Mitrano, 472 B.R. 706, 710 (E.D. Va. 
2012); In re Gaudet, 132 B.R. 670, 675 (D.R.I. 1991); In re Youngblood, No. 13–71071, 2013 
WL 5592904, at *7 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2013); In re Mattick, 496 B.R. 792, 799-800 
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2013); In re Kotche, 457 B.R. 434, 439-40 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011); In re 
Taylor, 462 B.R. 527, 530-31 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2011); In re Norsworthy, No. 05–15098, 2009 
WL 6499238, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2009); In re Letterese, 397 B.R. 507, 512 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 6 In fact, in some districts the nature of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to dismiss is 
dependent on the judge hearing the case. Compare In re Johnson, 228 B.R. 663, 668 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1999) (Schmetterer, J.) (holding that there is no absolute right to dismiss under § 
1307(b)), with Williams, 435 B.R. at 560 (Wedoff, J.) (holding that there is an absolute right 
to dismiss under § 1307(b)). 
 7 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 8 Id. at 372–73. 
 9 See Jacobsen, 609 F.3d at 649; Rosson, 545 F.3d at 767. 
 10 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
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Chapter 7 in 2004.11 The debtor represented to the bankruptcy court in his schedule 
of prepetition debts12 that his house, which he valued at $363,348, was secured by a 
note and deed of trust held by Washington Mutual Bank for $147,156.52, and a note 
and deed of trust held by “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates” for $156,929.04.13 In 
addition, Law applied the State of California’s $75,000 homestead exemption to his 
house.14 The combined value of the two deeds of trust listed in Law’s schedule was 
greater than the nonexempt value of his house,15 rendering the house allegedly bereft 
of any equity recoverable by his remaining creditors.16 Soon after Law filed his 
bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee,17 Alfred H. Siegel, instituted adversary 
proceedings,18 alleging that the “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates” deed of trust was 
                                                                                                                                         
 11 Id. at 1193. 
 12 A debtor must file with the court schedules listing his assets and liabilities, as well as 
his expenditures and income. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (2012). 
 13 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1193. Law’s residence was also encumbered by three judgment liens. 
In re Law, 401 B.R. 447, 449 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 14 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1193; CAL. CIV. PROC. § 704.730(a)(1) (West 2015).  
 15 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1193. 
 16 Id. 
 17 The bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) 
(2012). The Chapter 7 trustee, for example, is responsible for liquidating the assets of the 
estate. Id. § 363(b)(1). 
 18 Adversary proceedings are “full blown federal lawsuits within the larger bankruptcy 
case,” governed by Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Matter of 
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal citations 
omitted). Rule 7001 states that adversary proceedings consist of the following: 
(1) a proceeding to recover money or property, other than a proceeding to compel the 
debtor to deliver property to the trustee, or a proceeding under § 554(b) or § 725 
of the Code, Rule 2017, or Rule 6002; 
(2) a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other 
interest in property, other than a proceeding under Rule 4003(d); 
(3) a proceeding to obtain approval under § 363(h) for the sale of both the interest of 
the estate and of a co-owner in property; 
(4) a proceeding to object to or revoke a discharge, other than an objection to 
discharge under §§ 727(a)(8), (a)(9), or 1328(f); 
(5) a proceeding to revoke confirmation of a chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13 
plan; 
(6) a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt; 
(7) a proceeding to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, except when a 
chapter 9, chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13 plan provides for the relief; 
(8) a proceeding to subordinate any allowed claim or interest, except when a chapter 
9, chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13 plan provides for subordination; 
(9) a proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment relating to any of the foregoing; or 
(10) a proceeding to determine a claim or cause of action removed under 28 U.S.C. § 
1452. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. 
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merely Law’s attempt to remove all equity from his house and, therefore, defraud his 
remaining creditors.19 
Law claimed that a woman named Lili Lin was the lender of the sum secured by 
the deed of trust.20 Two Lili Lins, however, responded to the trustee’s adversary 
complaint: a Lili Lin of Artesia, California, and a Lili Lin of Guangzhou, China.21 So 
began the tale of two Lilis. Lili Lin of Artesia acknowledged in a stipulated 
judgment with the trustee that she had not made a loan to Law and that, in fact, Law 
had sought to include her in an attempt to institute a foreclosure of the deed of trust 
that would result in the fraudulent transfer of the house’s remaining equity to his ex-
wife.22  
The bankruptcy court was not convinced by the other Lili Lin’s representations. 
Lili Lin of China never physically appeared before the court, and the court found it 
suspiciously remarkable that, “despite her inability to speak English and her frequent 
lack of representation [she] managed to file . . . numerous motions, declarations, and 
appeals in pro per – all written in English, without record of translation.”23 Further, 
the court mistrusted Lili Lin of China’s written filings to the court because they were 
stylistically similar to Law’s and advocated the same positions, and because, for the 
purpose of her filings, she used Law’s address (as well as another California 
address).24  
Unpersuaded by Law’s and Lili Lin of China’s averments, the court determined 
that “the loan was a fiction, meant to preserve [Law’s] equity in his residence 
beyond what he was entitled to exempt as a homeowner, and a fraud on his creditors 
and the court.”25 As a remedy for the considerable time and money (over $500,000 in 
attorneys’ fees) expended by the trustee during the adversary proceeding, the 
bankruptcy court ordered that Law’s $75,000 homestead exemption be surcharged 
and applied to the trustee’s administrative expenses.26 Law appealed the surcharge 
order.27 
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) upheld the bankruptcy 
court’s surcharge remedy, holding that under Ninth Circuit precedent28 a bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                                         
 19 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1193. 
 20 In re Law, 401 B.R. 447, 449 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 21 Id. at 451–52. 
 22 Id. at 450-52. 
 23 Id. at 452-53. The term “pro per,” short for “pro persona,” means “on one’s own behalf” 
in Latin. Pro persona, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012). Pro per is synonymous with 
the more common “pro se.” See id. 
 24 Law, 401 B.R. at 453. 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. at 454-55. 
 27 Law v. Siegel (In re Law), BAP No. CC–09–1077, 2009 WL 7751415, at *4. (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2009). 
 28 District courts have appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1)–(3) (2012). Each federal circuit may, however, create a BAP, consisting of a three-
judge panel staffed by full-time bankruptcy judges, which hears appeals from the bankruptcy 
courts in place of the district court. See id. § 158(b), (c). BAP decisions are appealed to the 
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court may surcharge a debtor’s claimed exemptions when the debtor’s fraudulent 
conduct restricts the trustee’s access to nonexempt property of the bankruptcy 
estate.29 On subsequent review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the BAP’s 
affirmance.30  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether a bankruptcy court . 
. . may order that a debtor’s exempt assets be used to pay administrative expenses as 
a result of the debtor’s misconduct.”31 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, 
determined that it could not, and held that the bankruptcy court had exceeded its 
statutory and inherent powers in surcharging Law’s homestead exemption.32 
The issue in Law—that of the liability of statutory exemptions to a trustee’s 
administrative expenses—is irrelevant, in the abstract, to the Chapter 13 debtor’s 
right to dismiss. In fact, the question at issue in Marrama—whether the Chapter 7 
debtor’s right to convert is conditioned on good faith conduct—is substantively and 
procedurally more akin to the problem posed by § 1307(b). Law, however, in 
unmistakable terms, pronounced limits on bankruptcy courts’ authority to police bad 
faith conduct, and in so pronouncing rendered groundless the minority position’s 
support of a non-textually-based bad faith exception to § 1307(b).33 This the Court 
did while explicitly refusing to recognize Marrama as standing for the proposition 
that otherwise unqualified statutory rights are able to be limited by judicial fiat.34 
The decision, therefore, is directly applicable to the bankruptcy courts’ authority to 
place limitations on the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to dismiss and, in fact, controls the 
question. 
Part II discusses the current state of the Chapter 13 dismissal circuit split, 
providing an overview of § 1307(b) and other relevant sections of the Bankruptcy 
Code, illustrative pre-Marrama case law on either side of the divide, and the 
Marrama decision itself. This Part examines Marrama’s role in shifting the debate 
from one based primarily on § 1307’s text to that of the bankruptcy courts’ general 
powers to sanction bad faith conduct, as well as lower courts’ responses to that 
decision. Part III examines Law, paying special attention to the Court’s discussion of 
the limitations placed on bankruptcy courts’ statutory and inherent powers to police 
bad faith and abuse of the bankruptcy process. Lastly, Part IV details Law’s 
implications for the Chapter 13 dismissal context, concluding that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Law indicates that the minority position’s assertion that § 
1307(b) is limited by an extra-statutory bad faith exception is in violation of the 
                                                                                                                                         
relevant circuit court of appeal. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical 
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1757-58 (2008). Only the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
have BAPs. Id. at 1757. 
 29 Law, 2009 WL 7751415, at *7 (citing Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 30 Law v. Siegel (In re Law), 435 F. App’x 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 31 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2014). 
 32 Id. at 1195. 
 33 See id. at 1194-95. 
 34 Id. at 1197. 
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constraints imposed by the Bankruptcy Code on bankruptcy courts’ abilities to rout 
out bad faith.35 
                                                                                                                                         
 35 There is a relative lack of literature in this area. Practitioners and bankruptcy judges 
have discussed the issue to some extent. See, e.g., Frank Volk, A Debtor’s Right of Voluntary 
Dismissal under § 1307(b) Following Marrama,  AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2011, at 14; 
David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, Reasonable and Necessary Expenses Under Section 
1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, Postconfirmation Considerations, and the Effect of 
Conversion and Dismissal of Chapter 13 Cases, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 789, 869-70 (2002); 
Timothy D. Moratzka, A Conditional Escape Hatch: 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) and (c), AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 2000, at 31, 31; David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 137, 156 (1989). The most critical study on the matter is a 
student comment written by Gabriel Gonzalez. See Gabriel C. Gonzalez, Comment, Dismissal 
of a Bankruptcy Chapter 13 Filing: A Debtor’s Unconditional Right or Subject to the Court’s 
Discretion Based on Bad Faith?, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 295 (2010). Gonzalez provides a 
thorough analysis of the decisional and statutory landscape of the circuit split. The article 
details the history of Chapter 13 and the arguments for and against the Chapter 13 debtor’s 
absolute right to dismiss, examines the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation and 
the policies and legislative history of Chapter 13, and discusses the tools courts may use to 
prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process. Id. at 297-99, 301-05, 305-12, 313-18; see also 
Current Circuit Splits, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 103, 107 (2010) (discussing the circuit 
split); Joseph J. Wielebinski & Davor Rukavina, Bankruptcy, 64 SMU L. REV. 49, 66-67 
(2011) (summarizing the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 
F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010)).  
  The dearth of scholarly commentary may stem from the absence of a Supreme Court 
decision on point. Marrama and the debtor’s right to convert a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 
proceeding, however, has received a similar reception, with most analyses and commentaries 
written by practitioners or law students. See Volk, supra note 35; Gonzalez, supra note 35; 
Harrell, supra note 2; Avi Goldenberg, Supreme Court Rules that a Debtor Has No Absolute 
Right to Convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, 125 BANKING L.J. 84 (2008); John Rao, 
Impact of Marrama on Case Conversions: Addressing the Unanswered Questions, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 585 (2007); William C. Heuer, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of 
Massachusetts: Bad Faith Forfeits Right to Convert to Chapter 13, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 
2007, at 10, 10; Jeffrey W. Warren & Shane G. Ramsey, Revisiting the Inherent Equitable 
Powers of the Bankruptcy Court – Does Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts Signal a 
Return to Equity?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2007, at 22, 22. 
  Law, only recently decided, has (understandably) received less coverage than Marrama. 
In an article appearing in a recent issue of the Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and 
Practice, Ashley Champion argues that the Court’s opinion in Law has the potential to 
severely limit bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers. See Ashley D. Champion, Closing the 
Door but Opening a Window: The Equitable Power of Bankruptcy Courts after Law v. Siegel, 
23 NO. 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 (2014). Champion’s article is the most focused examination 
of Law. For other pieces that discuss the decision, see Christopher W. Frost, Section 105(a), 
Inherent Powers, and Surcharging Exempt Property: Law v. Siegel, 34 No. 4 BANKR. L. 
LETTER 1 (2014); Ferve E. Ozturk, Law v. Siegel: U.S. Supreme Court Limits Reach of § 
105(a), AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2014, at 28; Ashley M. McDow & Michael T. Delaney, 
Critical Vendors – Necessity or Nullity, 33 CAL. BANKR. J. 25, 45 (2014) (briefly discussing 
Law’s implications on the payment of critical vendors); Ward Benson, Nonmonetary 
“Historical” Defaults Should Not Always Prevent Assumption of Executory Contracts: State 
Contract Law as the Standard for the Cure Requirement in § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
23 NO. J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 (2014) (referencing Law in a footnote). 
  This Article is different in topic and scope from the pieces mentioned in the paragraph 
above. Applying the Law Court’s discussion of the bankruptcy courts’ limited abilities to 
police abuse under § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as its analysis of the Marrama 
decision, to the Chapter 13 dismissal concept, this Article argues, as stated above, that the 
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II. CHAPTER 13 AND THE VOLUNTARY RIGHT TO DISMISS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Presently, the courts are split as to the extent of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to 
dismiss. The majority rule—that such a right is absolute—has largely rested on the 
plain meaning of § 1307(b), which mandates that a court “shall dismiss” a previously 
unconverted Chapter 13 case upon the debtor’s request.36 Courts in the majority also 
support this conclusion by reference to the voluntary nature of Chapter 13.37 Before 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Marrama, the minority position was largely based 
on the view that a mechanical reading of § 1307(b) provides the dishonest debtor an 
unfair “escape hatch”38 and renders the court’s ability to convert a Chapter 13 
proceeding “for cause,” pursuant to § 1307(c) of the Code, a dead letter.39 After 
Marrama, the minority rule was augmented by many courts’ expansive readings of 
the bankruptcy courts’ statutory and inherent powers to sanction bad faith. 
This Part provides an overview of the circuit split. Subpart A briefly summarizes 
those sections of the Bankruptcy Code relevant to the Chapter 13 dismissal context. 
Subpart B examines the pre-Marrama decisional landscape, focusing on two 
opinions issued by the Second and Eighth Circuits that illustrate the pre-Marrama 
arguments for and against the Chapter 13’s debtor’s absolute right to dismiss. Lastly, 
Subpart C examines Marrama and responses to that decision by the lower courts. 
A. Statutory Landscape 
Section 1307(b) of the Code is the source of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to 
dismiss. That section states: 
On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted 
under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of [title 11], the court shall dismiss a 
case under [Chapter 13].40 
Section 1307(b) is written in mandatory terms and is the basis for the majority’s 
position that, absent a previous conversion, the Chapter 13 debtor’s motion to 
dismiss may not be denied by the court. 
Conversely, a large minority of courts maintain that § 1307(b) is qualified by § 
1307(c) of the Code. Section 1307(c) states, in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                                                         
Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right to dismiss his proceeding subject only to the text of § 
1307(b). Hopefully, this Article will provide guidance to courts wading through the many 
bankruptcy, district, and circuit court opinions on this issue, and provide a clear path 
supported not only by statute and policy, but also by the Supreme Court’s own limitation of 
judicial power and authority to correct and prevent abuses of the bankruptcy system.  
 36 See infra Part I.B. and C; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2012). 
 37 See, e.g., In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 408 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995) (stating that “the 
debtor’s absolute right to dismiss her chapter 13 petition is directly in harmony with the 
purpose of chapter 13. Chapter 13 was intended to be [a] purely voluntary chapter, as 
demonstrated by [11 U.S.C.] § 303(a)[,] which provides that a chapter 13 case may not be 
commenced involuntarily.”). 
 38 Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 39 See Part II.B; Molitor, 76 F.3d at 220; § 1307(c). 
 40 § 1307(b). 
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[O]n request of a party in interest or the United States trustee and after 
notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under [Chapter 13] to a 
case under [C]hapter 7 . . . or may dismiss a case under [Chapter 13] . . . 
for cause . . . .41  
Bad faith42 constitutes “cause” under § 1307(c).43 Under the minority view, the 
majority’s interpretation of § 1307(b), which mandates dismissal of the debtor’s case 
                                                                                                                                         
 41 § 1307(c). 
 42 Courts determine bad faith under § 1307(c) by examining the “totality of the 
circumstances.” See In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Alt, 305 F.3d 413, 419 
(6th Cir. 2002); Matter of Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1355 (7th Cir. 1992); Molitor, 76 F.3d at 220; 
In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Gier, 986 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 
1993); In re Sullivan, 326 B.R. 204, 211 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005); In re Farber, 355 B.R. 362, 
366-67 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). Courts take into account many factors in examining the 
totality of the circumstances. The First Circuit BAP in In re Sullivan, for example, noted that 
bankruptcy courts assess the following:  
(1) debtor’s accuracy in reporting his expenses and obligations; 
(2) debtor’s honesty in the bankruptcy process, which includes any 
misrepresentations to or attempts to mislead the court; 
(3) whether the debtor is unfairly manipulating the Bankruptcy Code; 
(4) the type of debt debtor is seeking to discharge; 
(5) whether the debt is dischargeable under Chapter 7 of the Code; and 
(6) debtor’s motivation in seeking relief under Chapter 13. 
Sullivan, 326 B.R. at 212. 
 
 43 In re Gress, 257 B.R. 563, 567 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000). Section 1307(c) contains a non-
exhaustive list of instances that constitute cause under the statute: 
 
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; 
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of [title 11]; 
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 of [title 11]; 
(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of [title 11] and denial of a 
request made for additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a 
plan; 
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan; 
(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of [title 11], and 
denial of confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 of [title 11]; 
(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition 
specified in the plan other than completion of payments under the plan; 
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within 
fifteen days, or such additional time as the court may allow, after the filing of the 
petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of 
section 521(a); 
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely file the information 
required by paragraph (2) of section 521(a); or 
(11) failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obligation that first becomes 
payable after the date of the filing of the petition. 
§ 1307(c)(1)-(11). Note that bad faith is not listed in § 1307(c). “[D]espite the absence of any 
statutory provision specifically addressing the issue, the federal courts are virtually unanimous 
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even if there is a motion to convert due to bad faith under § 1307(c), would render 
the latter provision a nullity. 
One other provision is important in the debate over the Chapter 13 debtor’s right 
to dismiss. Section 105(a) of the Code44 states: 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of [title 11]. No provision of [title 
11] providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be 
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or 
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or 
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.45 
Courts in the minority, increasingly so post-Marrama, maintain that § 105(a)’s 
reference to the bankruptcy court’s ability to “prevent an abuse of process” is further 
evidence of the existence of a bad faith exception to § 1307(b).46 The majority 
counters that § 105(a) cannot be used by bankruptcy courts to, in effect, amend the 
Bankruptcy Code through the creation of an extra-statutory exception.47 
B. Pre-Marrama Decisional Landscape 
The debtor’s right to dismiss his Chapter 13 proceeding has resulted in numerous 
trial and appellate court opinions on either side of the divide.48 While the Marrama 
decision greatly influenced the debate, pre-Marrama case law provides a glimpse 
into the bare statutory and policy arguments that form the basis of each position’s 
conclusion, free from the influence of the persuasive, yet non-binding (in the 
Chapter 13 dismissal context), Marrama decision. Therefore, before examining 
Marrama and its progeny, Section 1 of this Subpart discusses the Eighth Circuit case 
of Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor),49 and Section 2 discusses the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri),50 two cases that 
illustrate each side of the circuit split.  
1. The Minority Position: Molitor 
In Molitor, the Eighth Circuit held that Chapter 13 debtors do not have an 
absolute right to dismiss. Edward Molitor consistently shirked his obligations under 
a contract for deed51 for a three-bedroom house. Prior to the initiation of the case that 
eventually reached the Eighth Circuit, Molitor twice filed for bankruptcy to benefit 
                                                                                                                                         
that pre-petition bad-faith conduct may cause a forfeiture of any right to proceed with a 
Chapter 13 case.” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).  
 44 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
 45 Id. 
 46 See, e.g., In re Mitrano, 472 B.R. 706, 710-11 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). 
 47 See, e.g., In re Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 48 See supra notes 4 and 5. 
 49 76 F.3d 218 (8th Cir. 1996); see infra Part II.B.2. 
 50 199 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 1999); see infra Part II.B.1. 
 51 A contract for deed, also termed an installment land contract, is “[a] conditional sales 
contract for the sale of real property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 320 (7th ed. 1999). 
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from the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code.52 The owners of the house, John 
and Patricia Galle, eventually sold the home to Gary Eidson and Jeffrey 
Schoenwetter after Molitor failed to exercise a purchase option.53 One day before the 
county sheriff was to serve a writ of restitution on Molitor (who remained in the 
house even after it had been sold), the consummate evader filed for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy yet again.54 Eidson and Schoenwetter moved to convert the case to a 
Chapter 7 proceeding under § 1307(c), citing bad faith due to Molitor’s fraudulent 
misrepresentation of tax liabilities exceeding $100,000.55 Molitor filed a motion to 
dismiss under § 1307(b), but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, granting 
instead Eidson and Schoenwetter’s motion to convert.56 Molitor appealed the order, 
arguing that he had an absolute right to dismiss his case under § 1307(b).57 The 
district court affirmed.58  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s affirmance of the 
bankruptcy court’s decision.59 The court first assailed Molitor’s argument on policy 
                                                                                                                                         
 52 Molitor, 76 F.3d at 219. Under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition, collection activities are prohibited. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8) (2012). 
Creditors may lift the automatic stay “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection,” or 
if the debtor does not have equity in the property and the property “is not necessary to an 
effective reorganization . . . .” Id. § 362(d)(1)-(2). 
 53 Molitor, 716 F.3d at 219. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 219. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 221. The court based its analysis on its prior decision in Graven v. Fink (In re 
Graven), 936 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1991), which concerned the Chapter 12 debtor’s right to 
voluntarily dismiss his case. In Graven, Bobby Noah and Milly Ann Graven transferred 
substantial amounts of property to closely-held corporations and an irrevocable family trust 
for little or no consideration prior to and after they filed their petition for bankruptcy. Id. at 
380-82. During a hearing concerning the Chapter 12 trustee’s report on the Gravens’ allegedly 
fraudulent transfers, the Gravens moved to dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1208(b). Id. at 
381. The trustee then moved to convert the case to one under Chapter 7, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1208(d). Id. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion, and the district court 
affirmed. Id. at 382. 
  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court, determining that debtors do not 
have an absolute right to dismiss their Chapter 12 case under § 1208(b). Id. at 380. Section 
1208(b) states: “On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted under 
section 706 or 1112 of [title 11], the court shall dismiss a case under [Chapter 12].” 
  11 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (2012). Section § 1208(d) provides: 
On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may dismiss 
a case under [Chapter 12] or convert a case under [Chapter 12] to a case under 
[C]hapter 7 of [title 11] upon a showing that the debtor has committed fraud in 
connection with the case. 
Id. § 1208(d). Acknowledging that there is a potential conflict between §§ 1208(b) and 
1208(d), Graven, 936 F.2d at 385, the court stated that “the purpose of the bankruptcy code is 
to protect the honest debtor, not to provide a shield for those who exploit the code’s 
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grounds, reminding the debtor that “the purpose of the bankruptcy code is to afford 
the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start, not to shield those who avoid the 
bankruptcy process in order to avoid paying their debts,” and castigated him for 
“us[ing] section 1307(b) as an escape hatch.”60 Next, the court directed its attention 
to the interaction between §§ 1307(b) and 1307(c), writing that, were the Chapter 13 
debtor’s dismissal rights absolute even in the face of an opposing motion to convert, 
§ 1307(b) would prevent full application of § 1307(c).61  
Thus, the Eighth Circuit, based on policy concerns and the supposed 
incompatibility of § 1307(b) and (c), held that bad faith under § 1307(c) is an 
exception to the debtor’s right to dismiss his Chapter 13 case.62 
2. The Majority Position: Barbieri 
Conversely, in 1999, the Second Circuit, in Barbieri, became the first appellate 
court to hold that the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to dismiss is absolute.63 In Barbieri, 
Nina Marie Barbieri filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.64 In her Chapter 13 plan, 
Barbieri proposed to disavow a contract she entered into pre-petition with RAJ 
Acquisition Corp. for the sale of a multi-family apartment building for $585,000.65 
This fact notwithstanding, she then sought the bankruptcy court’s permission to sell 
the apartment building to New York Property Holding Corp. for $687,500.66 During 
a hearing on her application to sell the property, Barbieri moved to dismiss the case 
following the bankruptcy judge’s statement of intention to convert the case to a 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.67 The bankruptcy court dismissed Barbieri’s 
                                                                                                                                         
protection.” Id. An absolute right to dismiss under § 1208(b), in the court’s estimation, would 
not only lead to abuse, but also “would render [§ 1208(d)] useless.” Id.; cf. Molitor, 716 F.3d 
at 220. Interestingly, the Graven court found support for its decision in the Chapter 13 
dismissal context, writing that its decision “is consistent with the interpretation some 
bankruptcy courts have accorded 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) and (c) . . . .” 936 F.2d at 386. 
  Accordingly, the court held that “the broad purpose of the bankruptcy code, including 
Chapter 12, is best served by interpreting section 1208(d) to allow a court to convert a case to 
Chapter 7 upon a showing of fraud even though the debtor has moved for dismissal under 
subsection (b).” Id. at 385.  
 60 Molitor, 716 F.3d at 220.  
 61 Id. Specifically, the court wrote: “To allow Molitor to respond to a motion to convert by 
voluntarily dismissing his case with impunity would render section 1307(c) a dead letter and 
open up the bankruptcy courts to a myriad of potential abuses. We decline to do so.” Id. 
 62 Id. at 220-21. The Molitor court also considered Molitor’s argument that the bankruptcy 
court had improperly granted Eidson and Schoenwetter’s motion absent any showing of fraud. 
Id. at 220-21. The court held that “[n]o such showing is required to convert a case under 
Chapter 13” because § 1307(c) allows conversion “for cause,” which includes the bad faith 
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Id. at 220; see supra Part I.A. 
 63 Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 654 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the 
Second Circuit became the first court of appeals to hold that no [bad faith] exception 
existed.”). 
 64 Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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motion, declaring: “The Court, pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Code and Section 
1307(c) is today sua sponte converting this Chapter 13 case to a case under Chapter 
7.”68 The district court affirmed.69 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, writing that Barbieri “had the right 
voluntarily to dismiss her Chapter 13 petition . . . notwithstanding the clearly stated 
intention of the Bankruptcy Court to convert the case to Chapter 7 pursuant to § 
1307(c).”70 The court’s decision rested largely on the plain meaning of § 1307(b).71 
That section, recall, states that the court “shall” order dismissal of a Chapter 13 case 
on motion by the debtor.72 The court wrote that the word “shall” is a mandatory term, 
one of command that prevents the application of discretion by the court.73 If a court 
“shall” dismiss the debtor’s case upon motion by the debtor, the court has no 
authority to deny the motion based on allegations of bad faith, even if such 
allegations form the basis of a prior motion to convert under § 1307(c). The only 
limitation on the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to dismiss, then, according to the majority 
position, is § 1307(b)’s lack of previous conversion requirement.74 
After discussing subsection (b) of § 1307, the court turned to subsection (c), 
characterizing that provision as permissive.75 Subsection (c) states that “the court 
may convert” a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 on motion by another party, due to, 
among other things, allegations of bad faith.76 Relying on the canon of statutory 
construction that there exists a distinction between words of permission, such as 
“may,” and words of command, such as “shall,”77 when used in the same provision, 
                                                                                                                                         
 68 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of § 1307(c) provides that a party or the 
trustee may move to dismiss a Chapter 13 case, but does not state that the court may do so sua 
sponte. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2012). “[T]here is no doubt,” however, “that the bankruptcy 
court may also convert on its own motion.” Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F.3d 764, 
771 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)).  
 69 In re Barbieri, 226 B.R. 531, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 70 Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 622-23. 
 71 It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that “where the language of an enactment is 
clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable 
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning 
intended.” U.S. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Arthur W. 
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in 
the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 433 (1994). 
 72 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (2012). 
 73 Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 619. 
 74 Id.; see § 1307(b). 
 75 Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 619. 
 76 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 77 See Shea v. Board of Selectmen of Ware, 615 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 406 (1950) (citing Koch & 
Dryfus v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247 (1871); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 130 (2d ed. 1911)).  
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the court held that Congress’s insertion of the word “may” in subsection (c) (which, 
of course, immediately follows subsection (b)) indicates that the plain meaning of 
“shall” in subsection (b) was intended and, therefore, that the bankruptcy court has 
no discretion in ruling on a debtor’s motion to dismiss an unconverted Chapter 13 
case.78  
Aside from the text of § 1307, the Barbieri court also supported its conclusion by 
reference to Chapter 13’s voluntary nature.79 Chapter 13 is unique as compared to 
the other oft-used Bankruptcy Code chapters—Chapters 7 and 11—in that a debtor 
may not be forced to enter a Chapter 13 bankruptcy pursuant to the filing of an 
involuntary petition by his creditors.80 Because the Chapter 13 debtor’s post-petition 
income is dedicated to the debtor’s creditors (i.e., the debtor, in effect, is mandated 
to work for his creditors),81 Congress, in drafting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 
feared that allowing the commencement of involuntary Chapter 13 proceedings 
would violate the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition of 
involuntary servitude.82 The Barbieri court determined that the concept of a 
                                                                                                                                         
 78 Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 619-620. The court explicitly dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Molitor that construing § 1307(b) as conferring an absolute right to dismiss 
would render § 1307(c) null. Id. at 620; see Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 
220 (8th Cir. 1996). Said the court:  
It is true that if a court grants a debtor’s motion to dismiss under § 1307(b), the court 
will be deprived of the option, afforded by § 1307(c), of converting the case for cause. 
But that is no more significant than the fact that an order granting a creditor’s motion 
to convert under § 1307(c) would foreclose dismissal under § 1307(b).  
Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 620. Either party, noted the court, could make the same 
argument. Id. 
 79 Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the 
Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 803-04 (1991); Benjamin Weintraub & 
Alan N. Resnick, Involuntary Petitions Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 97 BANKING L.J. 
292, 293-93 (1980). Under § 303(b) of the Code, involuntary petitions may be instituted by 
three or more creditors who are “holder[s] of a claim against [the debtor] that is not contingent 
as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount” and which, 
together, are at least $15,325 more than any liens securing the creditors’ claims or, if there are 
fewer than twelve creditors, by at least one creditor whose claim is at least $15,325. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 303(b)(1), (b)(2) (2012). Relief will be afforded against the involuntary debtor if she is not 
paying her obligations (unless there is a bona fide dispute), id. § 303(h)(1), or a custodian has 
been appointed or taken possession “within 120 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition,” id. § 303(h)(2). 
 80 Wesley H. Avery, Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions: The Ultimate Debt Collection 
Device?, 116 BANKING L.J. 683, 684 (1999). Creditors may not file involuntary bankruptcy 
petitions under Chapters 9 or 12 either. Id.  
 81 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 586 (2005).  
 82 Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 195-96 (2009); U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII. The House Judiciary Committee of the Ninety-Fifth Congress noted: 
“Though [the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude] has never been 
tested in the wage earner plan context, it has been suggested that a mandatory Chapter 13, by 
forcing an individual to work for creditors, would violate this prohibition.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-
595, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 120 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. 
No. 95-595]. The committee also noted that involuntary Chapter 13 proceedings would be 
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voluntary Chapter 13 proceeding extends beyond the initiation of the case, but also 
to the decision to leave the same.83 Other courts have dismissed the notion that 
Congress’s fears that involuntary Chapter 13 petitions would violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment apply with equal force to a debtor’s right to dismiss.84 To the Barbieri 
court, however, the Chapter 13 debtor is a completely voluntary debtor, both as 
regards his decision to file, as well as to leave his Chapter 13 case. 
In addition to examining the text of § 1307 and the voluntary nature of Chapter 
13, the Barbieri court warned against expansively reading § 105(a) of the Code. In 
affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision, the district court in Barbieri relied, in 
part, on § 105(a)’s provision of authority to bankruptcy courts to “tak[e] any action 
or mak[e] any determination necessary or appropriate . . . to prevent an abuse of 
process.”85 The Second Circuit viewed the district court’s reliance on that section as 
                                                                                                                                         
violative of public policy, remarking, “it would be unwise to allow creditors to force a debtor 
into a repayment plan. An unwilling debtor is less likely to retain his job or cooperate in the 
repayment plan, and more often than not, the plan would be preordained to fail.” Id. In Toibb 
v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991), the Supreme Court, in response to an amicus brief arguing 
that involuntary consumer bankruptcies under Chapter 11 conflict with Congress’s position on 
involuntary Chapter 13 petitions, reiterated Congress’s concerns, writing:  
The argument overlooks Congress’ primary concern about a debtor’s being forced into 
bankruptcy under Chapter 13: that such a debtor, whose future wages are not exempt 
from the bankruptcy estate . . . would be compelled to toil for the benefit of creditors 
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s involuntary servitude prohibition. 
Id. at 165-66.  
  Congress’s belief that involuntary Chapter 13 proceedings raise involuntary servitude 
implications extends to non-consensual conversions of Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 cases. H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 120. Liquidation proceedings, however, do not raise Thirteenth 
Amendment concerns. See In re Jacobsen, 378 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). 
Therefore, involuntary conversion of a case under Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, pursuant to § 
1307(c), is not violative of the Constitution. Id. at 810. As explained by the bankruptcy court 
in In re Jacobsen: 
A statutory shield against involuntary servitude . . . is not a shield against the 
conversion of a case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. In contrast to the provisions in 
Chapter 13 compelling debtors to pay a portion of their future wages to creditors, 
debtors in Chapter 7 cases are not required to pay any future wages to creditors – 
rather, in a [C]hapter 7 case, non-exempt and unencumbered assets are liquidated and 
the proceeds distributed to creditors.  
Id.  
 83 In support of its determination, the court cited the Eastern District of Tennessee 
bankruptcy court’s assessment in In re Patton, 209 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1997):  
 
To allow a creditor to convert a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation 
notwithstanding a pending motion to dismiss filed by the debtor would permit the 
creditor to effectuate an involuntary petition without the need to satisfy the requisites 
of § 303 . . . . Such a result flies in the face of the voluntary nature of [Chapter 13] and 
circumvents the standard for an involuntary liquidation set forth in § 303. 
Id. at 102-03. 
 84 See Jacobsen, 375 B.R. at 810. 
 85 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
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“misguided,” and wrote that fear of abuse does not give courts authority to amend 
the Bankruptcy Code.86  
Molitor and Barbieri exemplify the pre-Marrama minority and majority 
positions. The minority feared that an absolute right to dismiss merely created an 
“escape shaft” for dishonest debtors and believed that such a right rendered nugatory 
the authority to convert due to bad faith Chapter 13 cases under § 1307(c). Section 
105(a)’s language also provided compelling statutory support in favor of a bad faith 
exception to § 1307(b). In contrast, the majority of courts found it unnecessary to go 
beyond the plain meaning of § 1307, finding subsection (b)’s text and the respective 
presence of mandatory and permissive language in subsections (b) and (c) 
conclusive. In addition, the majority position emphasized the voluntary nature of 
Chapter 13 and eschewed a reading of § 105(a) that would imbue courts with the 
authority to amend the Bankruptcy Code. 
C. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,87 
although concerning the Chapter 7 debtor’s right to convert to a Chapter 13, has 
dramatically influenced the Chapter 13 dismissal circuit split.88 Until Marrama, the 
debate largely concerned competing Code sections and policy considerations. Post-
Marrama, courts in the minority rely heavily on an expanded reading of § 105(a) and 
the bankruptcy courts’ inherent powers to sanction abuse in support of a non-
statutory bad faith exception. Section 1 examines the Marrama decision.89 Section 2 
discusses prominent lower court responses to Marrama in the Chapter 13 dismissal 
context.90 
1. The Decision 
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Marrama to determine whether 
a Chapter 7 debtor engaged in bad faith has an absolute right to convert his case to a 
Chapter 13.91 Robert Marrama filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 on March 11, 
2003.92 His principal asset was his house in Maine.93 While of significant worth, 
however, he represented in his relevant bankruptcy schedule that the house was 
valueless.94 Further, he falsely denied having fraudulently transferred the house to a 
trust pre-petition in order to evade creditors.95 Upon learning that the trustee intended 
                                                                                                                                         
 86 Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. (In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(writing that “concerns about abuse of the bankruptcy system do not license us to redraft the 
statute.”). 
 87 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 88 See infra Part II.C.2. 
 89 See infra Part II.C.1. 
 90 See infra Part II.C.2. 
 91 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. 
 92 Id. at 368. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/8
2015] THE CHAPTER 13 DEBTOR’S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DISMISS 849 
 
to acquire and liquidate the house, Marrama attempted to convert the case to a 
Chapter 13 proceeding pursuant to § 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.96 The 
bankruptcy court, finding that the debtor had acted in bad faith, refused to convert 
the case.97 On appeal to the First Circuit BAP,98 Marrama argued that he had an 
absolute right to convert his case under § 706(a).99 The BAP upheld the bankruptcy 
court’s decision,100 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.101  
Whether a debtor may convert his Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 case is governed by 
§§ 706(a) and 706(d) of the Code.102 Section 706(a) states, in relevant part: 
The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under Chapter 
11, 12, or 13 of [title 11] at any time, if the case has not been converted 
under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of [title 11].103 
Section 706(d) states:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a case may not be 
converted to a case under another chapter of [title 11] unless the debtor 
may be a debtor under such chapter.104 
Marrama argued that these provisions provide the debtor with a one-time opportunity 
to convert his case to one under Chapters 11, 12, or 13 “for any reason, and permits 
judicial inquiry into the conversion only [to determine] whether the debtor has 
previously converted the case” and to ensure that he is qualified to be a debtor under 
the chapter to which he wishes to convert.105   
                                                                                                                                         
 96 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2012); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 368-69 
(2007). 
 97 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 369. 
 98 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 313 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004). 
 99 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 370-71. 
 102 11 U.S.C. § 706(d) (2012). 
 103 Id. § 706(a). 
 104 Id. § 706(d). 
 105 Brief for Petitioner at 12, Marrama, 549 U.S. 365 (2007). Marrama based his argument 
on congressional reports on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated: 
Subsection (a) of this section gives the debtor one-time absolute right of conversion of 
a liquidation case to a reorganization or individual repayment plan case. If the case 
has already once been converted from Chapter 11 or 13 to Chapter 7, then the debtor 
does not have that right. The policy of the provision is that the debtor should always 
be given the opportunity to repay his debts, and a waiver of the right to convert a case 
is unenforceable. 
S. Rep. 95-989, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), at 94 [hereinafter S. 
Rep. 95-989]; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra note 82, at 380. The Court was not 
persuaded by the above-quoted legislative history. “The Committee Reports’ reference to an 
‘absolute right’ of conversion [was] more equivocal than [Marrama] suggest[ed].” Marrama, 
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The Supreme Court disagreed with Marrama, holding that a Chapter 7 debtor 
who engages in bad faith does not have an absolute right to convert to a Chapter 
13.106 In support of its conclusion, the Court primarily relied on § 706(d)’s 
requirement that the Chapter 7 debtor qualify as a debtor under the chapter to which 
she wishes to convert.107 This mandate, in the case of an attempted conversion from a 
Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13, requires that the debtor qualify as a Chapter 13 debtor. 
Under § 1307(c), recall, a Chapter 13 case may be dismissed or converted to a 
Chapter 7 due to a debtor’s bad faith.108 The Court reasoned that a court’s order 
pursuant to § 1307(c) dismissing or converting a former Chapter 7 case due to a 
debtor’s bad faith conduct “is tantamount to a ruling that the individual does not 
qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.”109 Therefore, the Chapter 7 debtor has an 
absolute right to convert her case to a Chapter 13, so long as she has not acted in bad 
faith.110  
Section 1307(c) does not mandate conversion or dismissal; rather, whether a 
motion to convert or dismiss under that section is granted is in the discretion of the 
court. Because, theoretically, a court may deny a § 1307(c) motion seeking 
conversion or dismissal although the debtor has in fact acted in bad faith, some grant 
of authority in addition to § 706(d) is required to authorize bankruptcy courts to 
prohibit a bad faith Chapter 7 debtor from converting her case to a Chapter 13 under 
§ 706(a). Seemingly for this reason, the Court invoked § 105(a) and the federal 
courts’ inherent powers to sanction bad faith and abuse in support of its holding. Of 
§ 105(a), the Court wrote: 
[T]he broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that 
is necessary or appropriate ‘to prevent an abuse of process’ . . . is surely 
adequate to authorize an immediate denial of a motion to convert filed 
under § 706 in lieu of a conversion order that merely postpones the 
allowance of equivalent relief and may provide a debtor with an 
opportunity to take action prejudicial to creditors.111 
                                                                                                                                         
549 U.S. at 372. First, the Court appeared skeptical that the phrase, “the debtor should always 
be given the opportunity to repay his debts,” S. Rep. 95-989, supra, at 94, referred to Chapter 
13 proceedings. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 372. Even if the phrase did refer to Chapter 13, the 
Court determined that the unqualified sentiment of the sentence was belied by the report’s 
statement, invoking § 706(d), that the debtor has no absolute right to convert to a Chapter 13 if 
the case has previously been converted. Id. Second, and closely related, was the Court’s 
conclusion that “the broad description of the right as ‘absolute’ fails to give full effect to the 
express limitation in subsection (d).” Marrama, 549 U.S. at 372; see S. Rep. 95-989, supra, at 
94. 
 106 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 371, 374. 
 107 Id. at 372-73; 11 U.S.C. § 706(d) (2012). 
 108 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2012); see supra Part II.A. 
 109 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 373-74. 
 110 The Court also stated that Marrama may have been barred from converting to a Chapter 
13 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), which prohibits Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors who owe 
obligations over certain amounts from filing. Id. at 372. 
 111 Id. at 375 (footnotes omitted) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)). The Supreme Court explored 
the contours of the federal courts’ inherent powers in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 
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The Court further remarked that courts’ inherent powers “might well provide an 
adequate justification for a prompt, rather than a delayed, ruling on an unmeritorious 
attempt to qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.”112 Little did the Court know that 
these quotations would dramatically influence the Chapter 13 dismissal split. 
Marrama, therefore, stands for the bright line rule that bankruptcy courts need 
not grant a motion to convert to a Chapter 13 filed by a Chapter 7 debtor alleged to 
have acted in bad faith. Marrama did not hold, and the facts of the case did not 
present the opportunity to so hold, that bankruptcy courts may deny a § 1307(b) 
motion to dismiss due to bad faith. Many lower courts, nonetheless, have held 
exactly that.  
2. Responses from the Lower Courts 
Marrama dramatically influenced Chapter 13 dismissal jurisprudence. At this 
point, it is unclear whether the circuit split can be aptly described as consisting of a 
contest between a “majority” position and a “minority” position as this Article has 
labeled the competing rules, for courts are still assessing the Marrama decision’s 
effects in the Chapter 13 dismissal context, and reaching opposite results. In fact, the 
minority position post-Marrama is gaining momentum, and in the near future the 
majority of courts may well hold that § 1307(b) does not confer an absolute right to 
dismiss a Chapter 13 case, if they remain unaware of Law’s dispositive effect on the 
matter. 
This Section discusses the lower courts’ responses to Marrama in the Chapter 13 
dismissal context, beginning with an overview of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson),113 and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Jacobsen v. 
Moser (In re Jacobsen),114 both of which declared that, under Marrama, no absolute 
right to dismiss exists.115 Then, this Section examines the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois’s decision in In re Williams,116 which provides a 
compelling, modern riposte to the bad faith exception argument as modified by 
Marrama.117  
                                                                                                                                         
(1991). The Court wrote that “[i]t has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers 
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers 
‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all 
others.’” Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). These powers 
include the ability to discipline members of the court’s bar, punish contempt engaged in both 
before and outside the presence of the court, and sanction fraud and abuse of the judicial 
process. Id. at 44-45. 
 112 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 375-76 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 
(1980)). 
 113 Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 545 F. 3d 764 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 114 Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 115 See infra Part II.C.2.a. 
 116 In re Williams, 435 B.R. 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 117 See infra Part II.C.2.b. 
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a. Marrama Controls: Rosson and Jacobsen  
The only federal appellate courts to rule on the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to 
dismiss since Marrama—the Ninth and Fifth Circuits—have held that Marrama 
controls and, therefore, that the debtor does not have an absolute right to dismiss his 
or her Chapter 13 case. The crux of the courts’ argument is that Marrama stands for 
an expansive reading of § 105(a) and courts’ inherent powers such that, pursuant to 
those powers, courts are authorized to impose limitations on otherwise absolute 
statutory rights. These decisions in turn have prompted lower courts in other circuits 
to hold the same.118 Before addressing Law and its substantive effect on the circuit 
split, therefore, it is necessary to examine the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ opinions in 
Rosson and Jacobsen.  
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosson, the Ninth Circuit BAP, in a pre-
Marrama decision styled Beatty v. Traub (In re Beatty),119 held that the debtor’s 
right to dismiss under Chapter 13 is absolute.120 In Beatty, after the bankruptcy court 
granted a motion to convert the debtor’s Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7, but before 
entering the order, the debtor sought dismissal under § 1307(b).121 The bankruptcy 
court granted the dismissal request, but later vacated the dismissal and converted the 
case to a Chapter 7.122 The BAP, based on the plain meaning of § 1307, “the 
purposes of Chapter 13,” and Chapter 13’s voluntary nature, reversed the order 
vacating the dismissal, holding that a debtor has an absolute right under § 1307(b) to 
voluntarily dismiss his Chapter 13 case if made before the court enters an order of 
conversion.123 
Rosson overturned Beatty, stating, “[a]fter Marrama . . . the ‘absolute right’ 
position is no longer viable.”124 The court’s decision was influenced by another pre-
Marrama decision issued by the Ninth Circuit BAP, Croston v. Davis (In re 
Croston).125 In Croston, a Chapter 7 case, the court held that the right to convert 
under § 706(a) is absolute.126 The court grounded its decision on Beatty, writing that 
                                                                                                                                         
 118 See, e.g., In re Kotche, 457 B.R. 434, 440 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011). 
 119 Beatty v. Traub (In re Beatty), 162 B.R. 853 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 120 Id. at 857. In support of its holding, the court cited, among other cases, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Nash v. Kester (In re Nash), 765 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985). In Nash, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 debtor who previously dismissed her case without 
prejudice and without receiving a discharge is not prohibited by res judicata principles from 
listing debts from her prior Chapter 13 case in her present Chapter 13 case. Id. at 1413. This 
was so because “[u]nder § 1307(b), a debtor has an absolute right to dismiss a Chapter 13 
petition.” Id. The Rosson court explained this statement away as likely being dicta, it having 
been written in the context of the res judicata effect of a Chapter 13 debtor’s dismissal, “not 
the potential conflict between § 1307(b) and § 1307(c).” Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson), 
545 F.3d 764, 772 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008). It also held that, if the statement was not dicta, 
Marrama had abrogated it. Id. 
 121 In re Beatty, 162 B.R. at 855. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 857.  
 124 Rosson, 545 F.3d at 772. 
 125 Croston v. Davis (In re Croston), 313 B.R. 447 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). 
 126 Id. at 451. 
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the § 706(a) and § 1307(b) analyses are “indistinguishable,” and so concluded that 
“the § 706(a) right to convert to chapter 13 is effectively absolute in the same 
manner as the corollary dismissal right under § 1307(b).” Marrama explicitly 
overturned Croston.127  
Without entertaining even a perfunctory examination of the relevant statutory 
landscape, the Rosson court agreed with the overturned Croston decision that “there 
is no analytical distinction” between §§ 706(a) and 1307(b).128 Because the Supreme 
Court in Marrama conclusively determined that there was no absolute right to 
convert under § 706(a), the Rosson court felt obliged to conclude that a Chapter 13 
debtor’s right to voluntarily dismiss her case is tempered by a bad faith exception.129 
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not merely support its decision by a less than 
searching comparison of §§ 706 and 1307. Significantly, the court wrote that “the 
most important point established by Marrama is that even unqualified rights in the 
debtor are subject to limitation by the bankruptcy court’s power under § 105(a) to 
police bad faith and abuse of process.”130 This rationale marked a dramatic 
expansion of bankruptcy courts’ powers and, as discussed below, exhibited a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between § 706 and § 1307’s 
statutory schemes.131 
In Jacobsen, the Fifth Circuit similarly held that, after Marrama, the Chapter 13 
debtor’s right to dismiss is tempered by a bad faith exception.132 Citing to Rosson, 
the Fifth Circuit determined that §§ 706(a) and 1307(b) were analytically 
indistinguishable.133 Jacobsen’s interpretive exercise was less cursory than Rosson’s, 
but exhibited a similar lack of depth. After concluding that Marrama controlled, the 
court merely noted that §§ 1307(b) and 706(a) both left the decision to dismiss or 
convert to the debtor and, because the Marrama court found that the latter was 
qualified by a bad faith exception, the court concluded the former necessarily was, as 
well.134 The court rejected out of hand the contention that § 706(d) added an 
analytical step absent in the Chapter 13 dismissal context, but provided no reason for 
this belief.135 Jacobsen also continued Rosson’s expansive reading of bankruptcy 
courts’ § 105(a) and inherent powers, writing that Marrama stands for the broad 
directive that courts have the authority to limit otherwise unqualified statutory rights 
to sanction bad faith and abusive conduct.136  
                                                                                                                                         
 127 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 365 (2007). 
 128 Rosson, 545 F.3d at 773. 
 129 Id. at 773-74 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)). 
 130 Id. at 773 n.12. 
 131 See infra Part II.C.b. 
 132 Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 660 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 133 Id. (citing Rosson, 545 F.3d at 773). 
 134 Id. at 660-61. 
 135 Id. at 661. 
 136 Id. 
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Marrama, Jacobsen, and Rosson have influenced many lower courts in holding 
that § 1307(b) is tempered by a bad faith exception.137 While the statutory schemes at 
issue in Marrama and in Jacobsen and Rosson are analytically distinct, the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits’ decisions to the contrary clothed an otherwise untenable statutory 
analysis and bright line rule with legitimacy. Those cases, however, have not 
persuaded all.138  
b. Marrama Does Not Control: In re Williams 
The most persuasive and methodical counter to the position held by Marrama’s 
Chapter 13 progeny was authored by the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff of the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois in In re Williams. In Williams, 
the Chapter 13 trustee moved to convert the debtor’s case to one under Chapter 7 
pursuant to § 1307(c).139 The debtor, in response, sought dismissal.140 The court 
                                                                                                                                         
 137 The Rosson decision persuaded Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Grossman of the Eastern 
District of New York, in In re Armstrong, 408 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009), to declare 
that, “after the Supreme Court’s decision in Marrama, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Barbieri, is no longer good law.” Id. at 569. In Armstrong, the Chapter 13 debtor, Nancy C. 
Armstrong, owned real property she valued at $1.8 million. Id. at 560. The trustee moved to 
dismiss Armstrong’s case when, after the meeting of creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 341(a), she 
failed to submit required documentation to the trustee. Armstrong, 408 B.R. at 560. Armstrong 
then filed a voluntary motion to dismiss. Id. The trustee, however, withdrew his motion, and 
argued that Armstrong’s case should not be dismissed, alleging that Armstrong had, after 
filing her petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and without seeking the trustee or court’s 
permission, contracted to sell her real property for $1.5 million. Id. 
  The court held that Marrama controlled. Id. at 569. After engaging in an extensive 
examination of the circuit split up to that point, including the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Barbieri, the Ninth Circuit’s Rosson opinion, and Marrama, id. at 562-69, the bankruptcy 
court wrote that it was ultimately persuaded by Marrama and Rosson in holding that § 
1307(b) was subject to a bad faith exception, id. at 569. The court enumerated four reasons for 
finding that Marrama overruled Barbieri. Id. at 570-72. Listed first, and seemingly believed to 
be foremost, of the reasons was the Marrama Court’s application of § 105(a). Id. at 570. The 
Barbieri court, Judge Grossman reminded the parties, held that § 105(a) could not be applied 
in contradiction of the text of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.; see Barbieri v. RAJ Acquisition Corp. 
(In re Barbieri), 199 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1999). “In Marrama,” however, wrote the 
bankruptcy court, “the Supreme Court took a much more expansive view of section 105(a) 
and recognized the bankruptcy courts’ need to exercise their inherent authority and their 
authority under section 105(a) to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process.” Armstrong, 408 
B.R. at 570.  
  The court also supported its opinion by reference to the post-Barbieri enactment of 11 
U.S.C. § 1307(e), which states that “the court shall dismiss or convert” a Chapter 13 
proceeding if a party in interest or the United States Trustee asserts that the debtor failed to 
file tax returns required to be filed pursuant to relevant nonbankruptcy law. See id. § 1308(a). 
Because both subsections (b) and (e) state that the court “shall” dismiss, the court maintained 
that, “[f]aced with competing motions to dismiss under section 1307(b) and to convert under 
section 1307(e), a court could no longer rely on the reasoning of Barbieri to find that section 
1307(b) trumps a creditor’s right to seek conversion of the case.” Armstrong, 408 B.R. at 572. 
 138 See, e.g., In re Procel, 467 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Williams, 435 B.R. 
552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Davis, No. 06-1005-GLP, 2007 WL 1468681 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2007). 
 139 In re Williams, 435 B.R. at 554. 
 140 Id. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/8
2015] THE CHAPTER 13 DEBTOR’S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DISMISS 855 
 
granted the debtor’s request, holding that debtors have an absolute right to dismiss 
under § 1307(b), tempered only by that section’s qualification that the case be not 
previously converted.141 
Judge Wedoff believed that whether the Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right 
to dismiss was a simple question of statutory construction.142 Three premises 
justified his proposition that § 1307(b) is not limited by a bad faith exception:  
1) Section 1307(b)’s text establishes an unqualified right to dismiss 
unconverted Chapter 13 cases. 
2) Only another statutory provision may limit § 1307(b) – courts may 
not modify statutes to achieve more favorable outcomes. 
 
3) No other statute qualifies § 1307(b).143 
These simple assumptions constitute a textually superior framework to that of the 
minority jurisdictions’ extra-statutory-based bad faith exception. Judge Wedoff 
analyzed each premise in turn. 
Little ink was wasted examining the text of § 1307(b). That section’s language, 
the court wrote, commands courts, “without equivocation,” to dismiss an 
unconverted Chapter 13 case upon request by the debtor.144 The court was also 
persuaded by the section’s legislative history, the Senate report on the enactment of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,145 which states:  
Subsections (a) and (b) [of § 1307(b)] confirm, without qualification, the 
rights of a Chapter 13 debtor to convert the case to a liquidating 
bankruptcy case under Chapter 7 of Title 11, at any time, or to have the 
Chapter 13 case dismissed.146 
So was established the first premise.147 
Moving to the second premise, the court reminded the parties that courts lack the 
authority to amend legislation.148 This limitation applies even though the court may 
be motivated by a commendable policy objective, although, given the range of 
sanctions available to courts to punish bad faith,149 the Williams court found the 
                                                                                                                                         
 141 Id. at 553. 
 142 Id. at 554. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 555. 
 145 Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 146 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S. Rep. 95-989, at 141. 
 147 The court also noted that a majority of reported cases hold that the debtor’s right to 
dismiss his unconverted Chapter 13 case is absolute. In re Williams, 435 B.R. at 555 & n.3 
(citing cases). 
 148 Id. at 556. 
 149 Courts may, in response to bad faith conduct by the debtor, dismiss a case with 
prejudice, 11 U.S.C. § 349(a), exercise continuing control over the estate subsequent to 
dismissal, id. § 349(b)(3), impose sanctions, FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011, or refer a debtor’s bad 
faith to the United States Attorney, 18 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also Gonzalez, supra note 35, at 
316-18 (discussing the options available to courts in dealing with a bad faith debtor). 
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concern motivating courts in the minority position—that of preventing the creation 
of an unfair “escape hatch” for bad faith debtors—lacking in gravity.150 Further, to 
judicially alter a statute in excess of statutory limitations is to sanction violation of 
congressional policies—in the case of § 1307(b), “the longstanding voluntary nature 
of Chapter 13.”151  
Lastly, the court proved the third premise by explaining that the two statutory 
sources of the alleged bad faith exception, §§ 1307(c) and, increasingly after 
Marrama, 105(a), are inapposite to the Chapter 13 debtor’s voluntary right to 
dismiss.152 Noting the tension between §§ 1307(b) and 1307(c), the court held that, 
“under the basic rule of construction” that the more specific governs the more 
general provision, a court facing opposing motions under § 1307(b) and § 1307(c) 
must necessarily grant the debtor’s § 1307(b) motion.153 This is so because 
subsection (b), which applies only to debtors in unconverted cases, is necessarily 
more specific than subsection (c), which allows dismissal by the court when 
requested by any “party in interest,” whether or not the case has been previously 
converted.154  
As for § 105(a), the Williams court opined that that section “cannot be employed 
to contradict another provision of the Code.”155 Instead, § 105(a) may only be used to 
implement specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, as such, must be tethered 
to a specific section, not to a policy objective unsupported by the statutory text.156 
Therefore, § 105(a) may not be invoked to implement a bad faith exception, not 
present in the text of § 1307, that limits the unqualified instruction that courts “shall” 
dismiss an unconverted Chapter 13 case on motion by the debtor.157  
Williams’s syllogistic reasoning provides a framework that courts can use to 
define the extent of the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to dismiss in a manner that is 
consistent with, and based on, the text of the Bankruptcy Code. The framework at 
once confronts the broader pre-Marrama statutory and policy arguments that 
continue to influence the debate by emphasizing the mandatory and permissive texts 
of § 1307(b) and (c) and the voluntary nature of Chapter 13, while at the same time 
undermining the post-Marrama obsession with § 105(a) as a fount of unconstrained 
equitable powers. This latter point is further supported by Williams’s comparison of 
Marrama and Chapter 7 conversions with § 1307 and Chapter 13 dismissals. 
Marrama, the court correctly noted, rested largely on § 706(d)’s mandate that 
debtors seeking conversion under § 706(a) must qualify as debtors under the chapter 
                                                                                                                                         
 150 In re Williams, 435 B.R. at 556. 
 151 Id. at 557. 
 152 Id. at 558. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 159; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) & (c).  
 155 In re Williams, 435 B.R. at 560. 
 156 Id. at 560 & n.12 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing Solow v. 
Kalikow (In re Kalikow), 602 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2010)) (writing that the text of § 105(a) 
itself “suggests that an exercise of section 105 power be tied to another Bankruptcy Code 
section and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or objective.”). 
 157 Id. at 560. 
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to which they wish to convert.158 Section 1307(b), however, contains no such 
eligibility limitation.159 “Without a separate statutory provision limiting § 1307(b) in 
the same way that § 706(d) limits § 706(a),” wrote the court, “the right that § 
1307(b) accords debtors to obtain dismissal of unconverted cases cannot be 
limited.”160 Jacobsen and Rosson’s shallow comparisons to the contrary are 
unsupported by the text of the statutes they purport to interpret. 
Consistent with its limited interpretation of § 105(a), Williams also rejected the 
proposition, supported by Jacobsen, Rosson, and like courts, that Marrama stands 
for an expansive construction of that section.161 Williams explained that the Marrama 
Court used § 105(a) to implement § 706(d), not to effectuate a policy unsupported by 
the Bankruptcy Code’s text.162 As discussed above, because § 1307(c) allows the 
court discretion in converting or dismissing a case due to bad faith, § 706(d)’s 
requirement that a debtor qualify as a debtor under the chapter to which he wishes to 
convert does not necessarily prohibit a bad faith Chapter 7 debtor from converting 
his case to a Chapter 13.163 Because of this, and instead of using § 105(a) to reach an 
end in excess of the provisions of the Code, Marrama merely used § 105(a) to 
“avoid the ‘procedural anomaly’ of permitting Chapter 7 debtors to convert their 
cases to a chapter for which they were ineligible.”164 The opposite position 
articulated by Marrama’s Chapter 13 progeny violates the principal that, in using its 
equitable powers, the bankruptcy court is constrained by the text of the Bankruptcy 
Code.165  
Judge Wedoff in Williams offered a thoughtful counter to Marrama’s Chapter 13 
progeny, and to all minority jurisdictions. Williams’s decision is supported by the 
text of § 1307, Chapter 13 policy, and the contours of the rights and powers 
emanating from the Bankruptcy Code. Further, Williams carefully explained the 
salient features that distinguish Marrama and the Chapter 7 debtor’s right to convert 
from § 1307(b) and the Chapter 13 debtor’s voluntary right to dismiss. 
Unfortunately, many lower courts continue to follow Rosson and Jacobsen’s 
examples.166 
III. LAW V. SIEGEL  
Like Marrama, Law v. Siegel does not concern the Chapter 13 debtor’s right to 
dismiss. Rather, Law stands for the simple, bright line rule that a debtor’s property 
exemptions are not liable for the payment of administrative expenses due to bad 
                                                                                                                                         
 158 11 U.S.C. § 706(d) (2012). 
 159 In re Williams, 435 B.R. at 558. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 560. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 164 Id. (citing Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 375 (2007)). 
 165 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 166 See, e.g., In re Criscuolo, No. 09–14063–BFK, 2014 WL 1910078, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2014). 
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faith.167 The legal principles expounded in Law in support of its holding, however, 
concern the limits of the bankruptcy courts’ powers to sanction abuse of the 
bankruptcy system and, as a general exposition of the law, are applicable to all 
bankruptcy cases. Further, through its discussion of Marrama, the decision proposes 
a general rule that is consistent with the Williams court’s specific Chapter 13 
dismissal framework and, thus, establishes that the right conferred by § 1307(b) is 
absolute. Before discussing Law’s implications in the Chapter 13 dismissal context, 
however, a summary of the decision is necessary. 
Law was a case about exemptions. Section 522(b) of the Code168 states that 
certain property of the debtor may be exempted from liquidation by the bankruptcy 
trustee169 to make attainable the debtor’s “fresh start” and prevent destitution.170 
Section 522(d)171 contains a list of twelve categories of property able to be 
exempted.172 Debtors may utilize the § 522(d) exemptions, or the exemption statutes 
of his or her state (as well as non-bankruptcy federal law).173 States may opt out of 
the § 522(d) exemptions, in which case debtors of such states may only claim 
exemptions under state and non-bankruptcy federal laws.174 A homestead exemption, 
such as that of which Law took advantage,175 protects the debtor’s equity in his 
home.176  
As in the dismissal and conversion contexts, the law of exemptions is not free 
from abuse. Some debtors conceal the existence or value of assets or otherwise 
impede the administration of the bankruptcy estate, thus decreasing in value the 
estate and the unsecured creditors’ ultimate return.177 Section 522(k) limits judicial 
reduction of the value exempted from property for the benefit of administrative 
expenses (subject to exceptions),178 providing: “Property that the debtor exempts 
                                                                                                                                         
 167 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2014). 
 168 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012). 
 169 Id. §§ 522(b)(1), (2). 
 170 See Augustine v. United States, 675 F.2d 582, 584 (3d Cir. 1982); H.R. Rep. No. 95-
595, supra note 82, at 126. 
 171 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2012). 
 172 Id. §§ 522(d)(1)-(12). Exemptions are based either on value or an item of property itself. 
In re Morrell, 394 B.R. 405, 409 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2008). 
 173 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (2012); In re Abdul-Rahim, 720 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 174 Abdul-Rahim, 720 F.3d at 712. 
 175 CAL. CIV. PROC. § 704.730(a)(1). 
 176 Timothy R. Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving 
Your Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
141, 144 n.2 (2011). 
 177 Warren E. Agin, Laying Down the Law: Supreme Court to Consider Surcharge Remedy, 
2013 No. 8 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (2013). 
 178 Section 522(k)’s exceptions state that the following exempt property may be liable for 
the payment of administrative expenses: 
(1) the aliquot share of the costs and expenses of avoiding a transfer of property that 
the debtor exempts under subsection (g) of [§ 522], or of recovery of such 
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under [§ 522] is not liable for the payment of any administrative expense . . . .”179 
Despite this prohibition, however, many courts prior to Law held that, pursuant to 
their inherent powers and § 105(a), bankruptcy courts were authorized to surcharge 
exempt assets to the extent of any loss caused by bad faith.180  
Law held definitively that federal law prohibits courts from surcharging 
exemptions to recover administrative expenses due to bad faith.181 The trustee in Law 
argued that his administrative costs incurred in the form of reasonable attorneys’ fees 
expended pursuing the adversary proceeding against Law could be recouped from 
proceeds equal to Law’s homestead exemption.182 The trustee argued, in effect, that 
§ 522(k) was subject to a bad faith exception. In his brief before the Supreme Court, 
he argued that Marrama controlled the question at issue, that case, in his view, 
standing for the proposition that “bankruptcy courts have broad authority under 
Section 105(a) of the Code and their inherent powers to take any action that is 
necessary or appropriate to prevent an abuse of process,”183 precisely the sentiment 
championed by Marrama’s Chapter 13 progeny.184  
The Supreme Court disagreed. Not one to mince words, Justice Scalia, in the 
opening lines of his analysis, declared: “It is hornbook law that § 105(a) ‘does not 
allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code.’”185 Justice Scalia wrote that it is impossible to “carry out” the 
numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by ordering actions in contravention of 
those very sections.186 Therefore, that section may only be invoked to further an 
express grant of authority emanating from the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Scalia also 
cabined the courts’ inherent powers, opining that “[c]ourts’ inherent sanctioning 
powers are likewise subordinate to valid statutory directives and prohibitions.”187 
Because § 522(k) states that exempt property “is not liable for payment of any 
administrative expense,”188 subject to two exceptions inapplicable to the facts in 
                                                                                                                                         
property, that is attributable to the value of the portion of such property exempted 
in relation to the value of the property recovered; and 
(2) any costs and expenses of avoiding a transfer under subsection (f) or (h) of [§ 
522], or of recovery of property under subsection (i)(1) of [§ 522], that the debtor 
has not paid. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(k)(1)-(2) (2012). 
 179 Id. § 522(k). 
 180 Agin, supra note 177, at  1.  
 181 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014). 
 182 Brief for Respondent at 29, Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014) (No. 12-5196) (Oct. 
22, 2013), 2013 WL 5765189.  
 183 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 184 See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 185 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194 (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], p. 105-06 
(16th ed. 2013)). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 11 U.S.C. § 522(k) (2012).  
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Law, the Court held that, in ordering that the value of Law’s homestead exemption 
be applied to the payment of the trustee’s attorneys’ fees, the bankruptcy court 
exceeded its authority.189  
While Justice Scalia’s discussion of the bankruptcy courts’ authority under their 
inherent powers and § 105(a) was sufficient to dispose of the case, he saw fit to 
distinguish the present case from the Court’s decision in Marrama. First, he 
distinguished the statutory schemes at issue in the respective cases, pointing out that 
§ 522 does not contain a provision analogous to § 706(d) which, in conjunction with 
§ 1307(c) and subject to the court’s discretion, conditions the ultimate success of a 
conversion to Chapter 13 on good faith conduct.190 Then, Justice Scalia directly 
confronted Marrama’s discussion of § 105(a) and the federal courts’ inherent 
powers, concluding that the Marrama Court’s declaration that its decision was 
supported by those powers was dictum.191 The justice wrote that the Court’s stated 
reliance on those two sources of power merely stands for the proposition, at most, 
that courts may, at times, “dispense with futile procedural niceties in order to reach 
more expeditiously an end result required by the Code.”192 This reaffirms his earlier 
conclusion that § 105(a) and the inherent powers could only be utilized to further a 
specific bankruptcy power. In the coup de grâce, Justice Scalia concluded: 
“Marrama most certainly did not endorse, even in dictum, the view that equitable 
considerations permit a bankruptcy court to contravene express provisions of the 
Code.”193 
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Law held that bad faith is not sufficient to 
warrant deviation from the express terms of § 522(k).194 In so ruling, the Court 
pronounced limitations on § 105(a) and the courts’ inherent powers to sanction abuse 
of process in the form of the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.195 As a 
logical extension of such limitations, Justice Scalia’s opinion rejected any 
interpretation of Marrama that allows for the limitation of an otherwise unqualified 
right.196   
IV. LAW V. SIEGEL’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHAPTER 13 DEBTOR’S  
RIGHT TO DISMISS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel renders hollow the minority 
rule’s reliance on an extra-statutory exception to the Chapter 13 debtor’s absolute 
right to dismiss. The exception has sometimes been found in § 1307(c) and that 
section’s interaction with § 1307(b), at other times in § 105(a) and the inherent 
                                                                                                                                         
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 1197; see supra Part II.C.1. 
 191 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1197. This is misguided because, as discussed above, § 706(d) does 
not, alone, explicitly prohibit a bad faith Chapter 7 debtor from converting to a Chapter 13. 
See supra Part II.C.1. 
 192 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1197. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 1195. 
 195 Id. 
 196 See id. at 1197. 
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powers, as well, and has always been justified by fear of the insidious escape hatch 
through which all wicked debtors flee when courts adhere to the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code.197 The bad faith exception to § 1307(b), however, is in fact 
nonexistent. Law confirms this proposition.  
Law eviscerates the minority position’s conclusion that § 1307(b) is tempered by 
a bad faith exception in two ways. First, the decision overturns by analogy the 
interpretation posited by many courts post-Marrama that Marrama applies to the 
Chapter 13 dismissal context and stands for an expansive reading of § 105(a) and 
courts’ inherent powers to sanction abuse of process. Marrama’s Chapter 13 
progeny maintain that §§ 706 and 1307 are indistinguishable. Because Marrama 
recognized a bad faith exception to a seemingly unqualified right in § 706(a), so the 
analysis goes, a similar qualification must inhere in § 1307(b).198 But even more 
significantly, these courts conclude that Marrama, through its reference to § 105(a) 
and the inherent powers in support of its holding, embodies a dramatic expansion of 
judicial authority that allows courts to impose limitations on otherwise unqualified 
rights to satisfy laudable policies, such as that of preventing the creation of an unfair 
escape hatch for bad faith Chapter 13 debtors.199 
Law took the wind out of the sails of the statutory comparison, and undeniably 
foreclosed further reliance on a reading of Marrama that allows courts to, in the 
name of preventing injury due to abuse and bad faith conduct, achieve ends that are 
not sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code. The Court in Law distinguished § 522 from 
§ 706, interpreting § 522’s allowance of exemptions to be discretionary in the debtor 
and, once exercised, unable to be dishonored by the court absent a specific statutory 
exception.200 While the Code does contain exceptions to this generally absolute right, 
no such exception applies to bad faith.201 This conclusion is buttressed by § 522(k)’s 
specific prohibition that, but for its two delineated exceptions, is mandatory in its 
terms.202 Section 522 is thus comparable to § 1307(b)’s mandatory text.203 The Court 
held that Marrama was not applicable in the exemption context because, unlike in 
that case, the debtor in Law did not violate an eligibility provision analogous to § 
706(d).204 Because § 1307 contains no such eligibility provision, Marrama is 
similarly inapposite to the Chapter 13 dismissal context.  
Even if Marrama is relevant to the absolute right circuit split, which Law’s 
statutory analysis belies, Justice Scalia could not have been clearer that Marrama 
does not stand for the proposition that, pursuant to their inherent powers and § 
105(a), courts are authorized to limit statutory rights where no such qualification is 
                                                                                                                                         
 197 See supra Part II.B. 
 198 See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
 199 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1197.  
 200 Id. at 1196. 
 201 See id. (writing that “§ 522 does not give courts discretion to grant or withhold 
exemptions based on whatever considerations they deem appropriate.”). 
 202 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(k) (2012). 
 203 In fact, § 1307(b) contains less exceptions than § 522, the only qualification to the 
former being that the Chapter 13 case must be unconverted. See id. § 1307(b). 
 204 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1197. 
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contained in the Code. Justice Scalia called into question the precedential viability of 
the Marrama Court’s reference to those powers, labeling it dictum.205 Even so, 
Justice Scalia stated that Marrama’s reference was in no way an endorsement of 
courts’ abilities to “contravene express provisions of the Code” in support of 
equitable considerations.206 Section 105(a) and the inherent powers of courts, then, 
were definitively limited to the text.207 Just as with § 522(k), the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code contains no bad faith exception to § 1307(b). By analogy, 
therefore, neither § 105(a), nor the courts’ inherent powers, may be used to limit § 
1307(b)’s mandatory language. Law thus invalidated the belief that Marrama stands 
for the proposition that “apparently unqualified right[s] [are] subject to an exception 
for bad faith . . . .”208  
No longer may bankruptcy courts rest on § 105(a) and courts’ inherent powers to 
find a bad faith exception to § 1307(b)—or any other provision—where no such 
exception is located in the Bankruptcy Code. The debate, it would seem, should thus 
be reconstituted around its original statutory and policy arguments, excluding, of 
course, any such arguments based on § 105(a). Those arguments, exemplified by the 
Second and Eighth Circuits’ decisions in Barbieri and Molitor, respectively, pit the 
plain language of § 1307 and Chapter 13’s voluntary nature against § 1307(c) and 
the general policy against giving bad faith debtors an unfair escape hatch.209 The 
general proposition articulated by Law, however, that bankruptcy courts are not 
authorized to achieve ends unsupported by the Bankruptcy Code, similarly renders 
the pre-Marrama minority position in violation of the extent of the bankruptcy 
courts’ powers. Section 1307(c) may no longer be relied on either as an explicit 
source of a bad faith exception, nor as an implicit limitation based on that section’s 
otherwise nugatory nature next to a fully operable § 1307(b), because the text of § 
1307(c) simply does not contradict or qualify § 1307(b)’s mandatory language. Any 
other conclusion would render meaningless the Supreme Court’s directive in Law 
that general equitable considerations do not authorize courts to exercise specific 
powers not found in the Bankruptcy Code.210 For this same reason the “escape hatch” 
                                                                                                                                         
 205 Id.  
 206 Id. 
 207 In this way, those powers were rendered much like the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [Congress’s 
enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). Containing no substantive force 
of their own, those powers may only be used to exercise authority “derivative of, and in 
service to, a granted power.” Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 
(2012) (discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause). See Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the 
Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code: The All 
Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 876 (2003). 
 208 In re Jacobsen, 609 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir. 2010); see also In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 
773 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 209 See In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Molitor, 76 F.3d 218, 220 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
 210 Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 
197, 206 (1988)). 
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argument, supported by a noble objective that is nonetheless absent from the Code, 
is untenable.  
Law mirrors the Williams court’s analytical framework, which explicitly 
prohibits courts from finding a bad faith exception to the unqualified right to dismiss 
contained in § 1307(b). Williams’s three premises—that (1) § 1307(b)’s text 
unequivocally imbues Chapter 13 debtors with an absolute right to dismiss, (2) a 
statutory provision may only be qualified by other statutory provisions (with the 
corollary that courts may not amend statutes), and (3) no statutory provision 
qualifies § 1307(b)211—stand for a proposition that is but a specific articulation of 
Law’s general rule that statutory rights granted by the Bankruptcy Code are only able 
to be limited by other statutory provisions. Therefore, Law, in mirroring this 
framework, indicates that the § 1307(b) imbues Chapter 13 debtors with an absolute 
right to dismiss their cases, subject only to the requirement that the cases be not 
previously converted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Currently, the majority of jurisdictions maintain that § 1307(b) imbues debtors 
with an absolute right to dismiss their Chapter 13 cases. The bankruptcy court in 
Williams articulated the most persuasive and statutorily grounded post-Marrama 
argument in favor of the majority rule, holding that, as no provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code qualifies § 1307(b), the unequivocal right guaranteed by that 
section is absolute. Conversely, the minority position asserts that 1307(b) is 
tempered by a bad faith exception. This exception has been found in § 1307(c) and, 
more frequently after the Supreme Court’s decision in Marrama, § 105(a) and the 
courts’ inherent powers to sanction abuse and bad faith conduct. Courts in the 
minority further argue that recognizing an absolute right to dismiss in the Chapter 13 
debtor creates an escape hatch through which bad faith debtors may unfairly escape 
and thus promotes abuse of the bankruptcy system. 
In Law, the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts are not authorized to 
recognize exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code that are not statutorily authorized. The 
decision mirrored Williams’s basic framework, and supports the majority position’s 
conclusion that § 1307(b) is not tempered by a bad faith exception. No court has 
recognized this assertion, and one court has rejected it.212 Unless and until courts 
recognize Law’s importance, Chapter 13 debtors in many jurisdictions will continue 
to be denied a right guaranteed them by the Bankruptcy Code. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 211 In re Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 212 In re Criscuolo, No. 09–14063–BFK, 2014 WL 1910078, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014) 
(holding that Law was inapplicable). The trustee in Criscuolo moved to dismiss the debtor’s 
Chapter 13 case with prejudice, alleging that the debtor concealed from the court and the 
trustee the fact that he earned over $1 million in 2012. Id. at *2. The debtor, in response, 
moved to dismiss (without prejudice) under § 1307(b). See id. at *3. The court found ample 
evidence to grant the trustee’s motion “under § 1307(c) based on the Marrama standard.” Id. 
at *4. The debtor argued that Law limited Marrama and was proof that the right to dismiss 
under § 1307(b) is absolute. Id. at *5. Confining Law to a case concerning the limits of § 
105(a), the court, without much explanation, held that it was not proof of the Chapter 13 
debtor’s absolute right to dismiss. See id. 
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